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FORUM
USE OF COUNSEL IN OKLAHOMA SMALL
CLAIMS COURTS: JUDICIAL
PERCEPTIONS, EMPIRICAL DATA, AND

RECOMMENDED REFORMS"
Robert L. Spurrier, Jr.*

I.

INTRODUCTION

A recurring issue in the small claims literature' is the propriety of
appearance of counsel in these supposedly simplified courts designed
for the pro se litigant. Following the lead of California, some states
have banned lawyers altogether from small claims proceedings, 2 and
t This article is a sequel to Small ClaimsAre Big Businessin Oklahoma, 14 TULSA L.J. 327
(1978), which provided the first empirical data on the operations of the Oklahoma small claims
courts. In addition to further analysis of the 1,500 sample cases which formed the basis for the
earlier article, a survey of judicial opinion of judges of small claims courts in Oklahoma is incorporated dealing with judges' opinions and perceptions concerning use of counsel in the state's
small claims courts.
* Associate Professor of Political Science, Oklahoma State University; A.B., A.M., University of Missouri; Ph.D., University of California, Santa Barbara.
1. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, SMALL CLAIMS COURTS: A NATIONAL ExAMINATION (1978); Best & Andreasen, ConsumerResponse to UnsatisfactoryPurchases.- A Survey
ofPerceivingDefects, Voicing Complaints,and ObtainingRedress, I1 LAW & Soc. REv. 701 (1977);
Driscoll De Minimi CuratLex-Small Claims Courts in New York City, 2 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
479 (1974); King, Small Claims Practicein the United States, 52 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 42 (1977);
Kosmin, The Small Claims Court Dilemma, 13 Hous. L. REv. 934 (1976); Sarat, Alternatives in
Dir ute Processing: Litigationin a Small Claims Court, 10 LAW & Soc. Rav. 339 (1976); Weller,
Ru
a and Ma-tin, Success in Small Claims Is a Lawyer Necessary?, 61 JUD. 176 (1977);
A.B.A., Report on the National Conference on Minor DisputesResolution (1977).
See also the two studies cited note 13, infra, which in addition to discussing the effect of
counsel in small claims litigation also provide drafts of model small claims statutes for adoption
by legislatures; Yngvesson & Hennessey, Small Claims, Complex Disputes: A Review of Small
Claims Literature,9 LAW & Soc. REv. 219 (1975).
2. States banning attorneys include California, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 117g (West 1970);
© 1979 Tulsa Law Journal. Republication and Reprint Rights Reserved
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others have enacted legislation which bars counsel unless special leave
of the court is granted Oklahoma's statutory scheme for small claims
adjudication, like that in a majority of the states, places no such restriction on the appearance of counsel.' The purpose of this article is to
examine the Oklahoma system in light of a survey of judicial perceptions5 and a random sample of small claims cases drawn from three
Oklahoma counties6 to determine whether the legislature would be well
advised to amend the Small Claims Procedure Act (the Act) so as to
limit the appearance of counsel.
District courts in Oklahoma have been dealing with small claims8
for over a decade under the current statute, yet this area of state judicial operations has received scant attention. While law journal articles
Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. § 633-28 (1976) (except in residential landlord-tenant cases involving
security deposits); Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 1-2308 (1947); Kansas, KAN. STAT. § 20-1310 (1974);
Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.8408 (1967); Montana, MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 13-354
(1947) (unless both sides are represented); and Nebraska, NEB. REv. STAT. § 24-523 (1975).
3. States imposing a leave-of-court restriction include Minnesota, MINN. STAT. § 491.02
(1971); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1925.13 (Page 1971); Oregon, ORE. REV. STAT. § 55.090
(1977-78); and Washington, WASH. REV. CODE § 12.40.080 (1951).
4. The Oklahoma Small Claims Procedure Act, OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 1751-1771 (Supp.
1978), specifically allows for representation by counsel.
5. The judicial survey was conducted in early 1979 by mailing a questionnaire to the small
claims court clerk in each Oklahoma county requesting certain statistical information and requesting that it then be given to the judge primarily responsible for disposition of small claims in the
county. The response rate was 84.4%, an unusually high rate for such mailed surveys. The author
would like to express his apreciation to the judges and clerks for their efforts in completing the
survey questionnaire.
6. The counties were Tulsa, Oklahoma, and Payne. The data from these cases supported
Spurrier, Small Claims are Big Business in Oklahoma, 14 TULSA L.J. 327 (1978).
7. This study employs cases, selected on a random basis in an effort to eliminate the possibility of sampling bias. The random sample of cases was drawn by dividing the total number of
cases for the calendar year in each of the three Oklahoma judicial districts (information provided
by the respective court clerks) by 500, the desired sample size. The resulting quotient provided the
skip interval, which is the number of cases to skip before taking the next sample case. The location of the first case was determined by selecting a number at random within the skip interval for
each district. This method of sampling is possible because all small claims cases are assigned a
docket number according to a consecutive sequence for the entire calendar year.
In the event the docket book (Payne County) or docket sheets (Oklahoma and Tulsa Counties) did not provide complete information, the case file was examined to complete the data base
for that particular case. Only when the case file was missing (which occurred in a few instances in
which attorneys had checked out files or they were otherwise unavailable) was an alternate case
used. The systematic method for selecting such alternate cases was to take the next case in order
of docket sequence.
In some instances the docket records and case fies did not provide information on every
point covered in the sample survey. Those items were scored as "missing information" or "other"
in the survey sheet for the case. Because in any survey of this type and size it is almost inevitable
that some data will be missing, the absence of one or two items in a file did not necessitate rejecting that case in favor of an alternate case.
8. Under the Act, a small claim is a civil suit for an amount not exceeding $600 (amended
from $400 in 1976) with the exception of libel and slander suits. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1751
(Supp. 1978).
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have appeared noting the statutory provisions, 9 it was not until 1978

that empirical findings reflecting actual operations of the small claims
courts were published.' ° That study indicated a surprisingly high rate
of appearance of counsel" and led to this inquiry. To form an empirical data base, a random sample of small claims cases from the 1977
dockets of the small claims courts of Oklahoma, Tulsa, and Payne

counties' 2 was employed in conjunction with the results of a questionnaire sent to the judge primarily responsible for disposition of small
claims litigation in each Oklahoma county. These two sources of information 3 should aid in an appreciation of the effect of counsel in the
Oklahoma small claims court.

II.

GOALS OF SMALL CLAIMS ACTS AND THE OKLAHOMA
STATUTORY SCHEME

Both in original conception and actual usage small claims courts
strive to facilitate the access of the unassisted individual to simple, inexpensive, and speedy justice. A model small claims court t4 fashioned
from the features commonly found in the literature and the statutes
would be characterized by simplified procedures in comparison with
ordinary litigation, minimum expenses, and an aim of speedy disposition of the cases. The results of this speedy justice would not depend
on the legal training or experience of the litigants. All of these factors
are essential to the small claims court if it is to meet the needs of the
persons making most frequent use of it-pro se litigants.
Oklahoma's statutory scheme for adjudicating small claims is for
the most part consistent with the model outlined above. Filing a case
15
involves only filling in a few blanks on a form provided by the court,
9. Fraser, Oklahoma'sNew JudicialSystem, 21 OKLA. L. REv. 373, 402 (1968); Note, Valid
iy of Service of Process by Mail When There is No Return Recept: The Outer Limits of Due
Process, 25 OKLA. L. REv. 566 (1976).
10. Spurrier, supra note 6.
11. Id. at 336.
12. See note 7 sufpra. The counties were selected because Tulsa and Oklahoma counties have
the two largest dockets of small claims cases, and because of the convenience of Payne County to
the author. The data were gathered in early 1978.
13. The judges survey included both questions of court clerks on office practice and statistics
and questions of judges concerning actual handling of small claims litigation.
14. Such attempts in the form of model statutes have been recently considered. See Joseph &
Friedman, ConsumerRedress Through the Small Claims Court:A ProposedModel Consumer JusticeAct, 18 B. C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 839 (1977); Special Project, JudicialReformat the Lowest
Level: A Model Statutefor Small Claims Courts, 28 VAND. L. REv. 711 (1975).
15. The blanks to be filled in require the name of plaintiff, name of defendant, mailing address of defendant, amount in controversy, and (in replevin and forcible entry and detainer cases)
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and court clerks are directed to provide assistance in drafting the complaint. 16 Pre-trial procedure is simple because the only other pleading
permitted is a counterclaim. No responsive pleading is permitted, nor
are pre-trial discovery devices allowed.1 7 At trial, the judge is given
wide discretion to dispose of the case through simplified procedures.
The Oklahoma statute imposes only minimal fees for small claims
filing and service of process. 8 Attorney's fees are limited by statute
under some circumstances. 9 The only court costs assessed against the
losing party are the cost of filing and service of process. In terms of
speedy justice, the Act provides for trial within ten days, 20 and a maximum period between filing and trial of thirty days.2 '
The goal of providing equal justice in small claims cases, regardless of the training or experience of the parties, is met in part by the
provision for informal procedures. Apro se litigant is not placed at a
fatal disadvantage simply because of lack of familiarity with courtroom
procedure. Beyond this, however, the legislature specifically empowered the judge in small claims cases to call witnesses and order production of evidence on his own motion when justice requires.22 Thus, the
judge himself may require additional evidence or question the witnesses to reach a just resolution of the case.
III.

COLLECTED DATA ON THE EFFECT OF COUNSEL

What is contemplated in a statute is not necessarily what goes on
in the courtroom. In assessing whether the Oklahoma small claims
courts are effectuating the goal of providing equal justice to all parties,
regardless of legal training or experience, the judges survey is useful.
Judges were asked whether it is their practice to "balance" the presentation of the case through questioning (while remaining neutral in the
decision) when a pro se litigant is opposed by counsel. Sixty-one
a description ofproperty. The form is provided for by the Act. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1753 (Supp.
1978).
16. Id. § 1754. Court clerks responding to the state-wide survey indicated that such assistance is forthcoming. Only two of the sixty-five clerks responded that they did not provide such
assistance.
17. Id. §§ 1758, 1760.
18. Id. § 1764.
19. The amount of attorney's fees which may be awarded in a default judgment is limited to
ten percent of the award. Id. § 1751.
20. Id. § 1756. This is the minimum time period, assuming that the defendant has at least
seven days notice.
21. Id. This period is necessarily exceeded if there is difficulty securing service of process on
the defendant.
22. Id. § 1761.
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(93.8%) of the judges responded that they do attempt to impose such a
balance, while four (6.2%) indicated that they do not do so. 23 While a
simple yes or no answer to such a question cannot be used to gauge the
depth to which a judge is willing to probe or the point at which the
obligations of decisional neutrality limit judicial questioning, we can at
least infer that the great majority of Oklahoma small claims court
judges attempt to protect the interests of thepro se litigant against the
threat of a potentially unfair advantage to the party represented by
counsel.
Another way to determine whether the interests of thepro se litigant are adequately protected in the Oklahoma small claims court is to
examine the sample cases comparing the results achieved by represented plaintiffs with those ofpro se plaintiffs. 24 In the model court in
which all litigants receive precisely the same opportunity to make their
case, we would assume that the presence or absence of counsel would
be of no significance. The sample cases demonstrate this not to be so.
Represented plaintiffs fare significantly better than theirprose counterparts, even in an atmosphere in which the judges report that they attempt to balance the scales of justice.
Perhaps the simplest way to illustrate the effect of counsel is to
compare the results achieved by plaintiffs in cases which reached disposition in small claims courts. Table I gives this data for the resolved
cases in the sample.25
23. The question presented to the judges was: If one party is represented by counsel and the
other is not, do you see it as your responsibility to "balance" the presentation of evidence by
asking questions, etc., while remaining neutral in deciding the case?
24. The author hoped to be able to analyze the effect of having defense counsel present in
small claims court. Very early in the research process, however, it became apparent that the court
records were seriously deficient in recording defense counsel. Plaintiffs' counsel are regularly
named in court records when the cases are filed either in the plaintiff's affidavit form or on the
docket sheet, or both. Whether the defendant is represented by counsel, however, is not regularly
brought to the attention of the court clerk by responsive pleadings and the like since these are
prohibited by the Oklahoma Small Claims Procedure Act, and there is no apparent mechanism in
any of the districts studied to record this information in a routine fashion. Even in cases observed
by the author where defense counsel was present, there was no entry of that fact on the court
records.
Given the obvious lack of reliable data on representation of the defendant in small claims
litigation, it would be grossly misleading to make a statement on the basis of the few records
which did for some reason indicate an attorney for the defense. Rather than do so in the text, the
matter has been excluded from consideration because of the lack of accurate data. It was, of
course, disappointing to find that these data were not available. Certainly the presence of defense
counsel is a variable which influences the operations of Oklahoma's small claims court, although
in terms of actual trial success the data on plaintiff's counsel suggest that the importance may be
less than one would expect.
25. Pending cases are necessarily excluded; hence the number of cases decreases from that of
the total sample.
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TABLE I
CASE DISPOSITION BY PLAINTIFF REPRESENTATION
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
Plaintiff
Plaintiff
Plaintiff
Defend- Dismissal
by
after
Dismissal
ant
by Court
Default
Contest
after

Total

Contest
Represented
Plaintiffs

200
(63.5%)

53
(16.8%)

51
(16.2%)

4
(1.3%)

7
(2.2%)

315
(100%)

Pro Se
Plaintiffs

343
(47.6%)

123
(17.0%)

164
(22.7%)

17
(2.4%)

74
(10.3%)

721
(100%)

By collapsing the categories in Table I into plaintiff-favorable (Colunns A-C) and plaintiff-unfavorable (Columns D and E) results, a
comparison may be made.26 Represented plaintiffs achieved favorable
results in 304 cases while they received unfavorable decisions in 11
cases for a 96.5% victory rate. Thepro se plaintiffs, however, could not
claim so high an average. They prevailed in 630 dispositions and lost
91 cases, for a victory rate of 87.4%. While a winning percentage of
over 87% is hardly low, even in small claims litigation, the represented
plaintiffs still had an almost ten percent higher rate of victories.
When considering the cases by specific mode of disposition, additional points of interest appear. First, represented plaintiffs had a
much greater percentage of suits won by default (63.5%) than didprose
plaintiffs (47.6%). Given the fact that these cases were never actually
tried,27 the skill of counsel in presenting arguments or the inexperience
of the defendant was of no import. Likewise, the judge is in no position
to balance in a case which never goes to trial. The most likely explanation for the substantially greater victory by default rate for represented
plaintiffs is that the defendant faced by such a plaintiff is more likely to
assume that he is defeated before he starts than one faced by apro se
plaintiff, someone at least nominally his "equal" in terms of legal ability and courtroom experience. 28 Rather than face what he assumes to
26. Collapsing categories for this purpose is valid because, from the comments of judges and

court clerks, it is relatively certain that most plaintiff dismissals result from receipt of satisfaction
from the defendant prior to the trial date.
27. In one sense there is a trial in that Graves v. Walters, 534 P.2d 486, 487 (Okla. Ct. App.

1975), requires that the plaintiff submit evidence in a default case to justify his claim. Precisely
how carefully this rule is adhered to is not determined by this study.

28. It is of course possible that an experienced pro se litigant might have an advantage over a
first-time pro se defendant. Also, a defendant aware of the statutory limit on an award of attor-

ney's fees in default cases might arguably reason that it would be better not to appear. It is,
however, most unlikely that a significant number of small claims defendants would have such
precise knowledge of the statute.
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be nearly certain defeat at the hands of a lawyer in court or go to the
expense of hiring an attorney of his own, the defendant simply fails to
appear for trial and loses by default.29
The presence of counsel for the plaintiff at trial does little to improve the percentage of cases actually won after contest (Column B).
Represented plaintiffs prevailed in 16.8% of the cases, while pro se
plaintiffs won in 17.0%. Likewise, the percentages for cases lost to the
defendant after contest are similar: 1.3% for represented plaintiffs and
2.4% for pro se plaintiffs. If dismissal by the court is tantamount to
defendant victory, however, the presence of an attorney for the plaintiff
takes on increased importance in that the figure for represented plaintiffs losing in the courtroom (Columns D and E) is 3.5% while the same
figure forpro se plaintiffs is 12.7%.30 This may indicate that attorneys
are playing a screening role in the small claims cases they handle
through advising their clients not to pursue hopeless cases. Thepro se
litigant, without such advice, proceeds and finds the case decided adversely.
According to the figures in Column C (plaintiff dismissals), which
also represents results favorable to plaintiffs,pro se plaintiffs fare somewhat better than represented plaintiffs (22.7% to 16.2%). If we assume
that the overwhelming majority of these dismissals comes as the result
of out-of-court resolution satisfactory to the plaintiff,3 ' it would appear
that the two types of plaintiffs are able to secure remedies without trial
in approximately the same ratio.
Lawyers in Oklahoma small claims litigation do significantly affect
the outcome of the cases. This is not because of their courtroom skills
but is the result of their apparent ability to deter the appearance of the
defendant and produce a default judgment for their client, and to a
perhaps lesser extent because of their prevention of the filing of hopeless cases.32
Yet the data in Table I may mask important distinctions in terms
of the outcome of the case. Perhaps attorneys are more likely to secure
judgment for the entire amount of the claim than litigants who argue
29. The defendant would have no way to know, of course, that in cases which actually go to

trial represented plaintiffs fare about the same as pro Se plaintiffs.
30. Columns D and E may be collapsed in this fashion because both concern a manner of
giving victory to the defendant.
31. Both court clerks and judges interviewed so stated.

32. The prospectivepro se plaintiff may choose not to file a case after first consulting with an
attorney, but there is no way to determine the instance of such happenings.
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their own cause. Analysis of the data from this perspective may be
made from Table II.
TABLE II

AWARD AMOUNT BY PLAINTIFF REPRESENTATION

Represented Plaintiffs
Pro Se Plaintiffs

Full Amount

Partial

Awarded

Amount
Awarded

223
(89.6%)
362
(80.1%)

26
(10.4%)
90
(19.9%)

Total

249
(100%)
452
(100%)

The data presented in Table II are taken from cases seeking
money damages in which the plaintiff received a monetary award. In
the aggregate the figures indicate that represented plaintiffs are more
likely to secure complete monetary victory than are pro se plaintiffs.
This conclusion, however, must be modified to accommodate the fact
that in default judgments the plaintiff is likely to receive the ful
amount of his claim. The data indicate this to be true in approximately
ninety percent of the cases, with no significant difference between the
plaintiff types.3 3 As represented plaintiffs have a significantly greater
percentage of default victories, the figures from Table II must be corrected for the default rate. With only those cases which actually went
to trial being included, the represented plaintiffs' position is markedly
improved. Represented plaintiffs secured a full award in 78.4% of their
cases (40 of 51), whilepro se plaintiffs did so in 51.7% of theirs (59 of
114). Thus it appears that representation by a lawyer is advantageous
to the plaintiff in terms of the size of award, though of lesser value in
terms of the percentage of cases won which go to trial.
The data do not provide information to explain this occurrence.
Lawyers may serve a screening function in terms of filing suit for only
the amount legitimately due while pro se plaintiffs may inflate their
damages in the claim. Another factor could be that in preparation for
trial an attorney could be expected to gather together all relevant documentation while apro se plaintiff might not be fully aware of the evidence necessary to support his claim in its entirety.
A third factor is the effort to enforce a judgment rendered in small
33. This seems to indicate that judges do require proof even in default cases.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol15/iss1/5

8

Spurrier: Use of Counsel in Oklahoma Small Claims Courts: Judicial Percepti
TULSA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 15:70

claims court. Are represented plaintiffs more likely to employ the judicial enforcement machinery of hearings on assets, garnishment, and attachment than pro se plaintiffs? The sample cases evince almost no
difference in the enforcement rate: Represented plaintiffs sought enforcement in 22.1% of their victories (56 of 253, including defaults), and
pro se plaintiffs did so in 21.9% of their favorably decided cases (102 of
466, including defaults). The presence or absence of counsel for the
plaintiff apparently has no bearing on whether judicial enforcement beyond the initial judgment will be sought in small claims cases in the
counties studied.
IV.

THE COST OF COUNSEL

Presence or absence of counsel can greatly affect small claims litigation in terms of the expense to litigants. The Oklahoma legislature,
clearly aware of this fact, limited the amount of attorney's fees which
could be awarded as part of a default judgment in small claims court.34
In default cases, the attorney's fee awarded by the judge may not exceed ten percent of the judgment. The Act does not limit the award of
attorney's fees in a contested case, nor does it impose any limitation on
the amount the plaintiff's attorney may charge his client above and beyond the amount awarded by the court. This statutory arrangement
has the ironic result of actually penalizing the defendant who appears
for trial and loses his case. If he defaults, his greatest liability for attorney's fees will be ten percent of the judgment (never greater than $60
under the current $600 limitation on small claims jurisdiction in
Oklahoma). If he appears for trial, presumably the obligation of the
law-abiding citizen with respect for the judicial process, and loses even
though he admits he owes most or all of the amount in question, he
may be assessed attorney's fees exceeding the amount of damages
awarded.3" Penalizing the defendant for appearing in court is an unfortunate result of the statute, although it was no doubt written with the
view that counsel at trial earns more compensation than he does in a
default case. In reality, however, the attorney must still appear to claim
his default judgment; and given the relative brevity of small claims
hearings, time expended by the lawyer for a trial is minimal.
34. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1751 (Supp. 1978).

35. At least one judge interviewed indicated that this had actually taken place, while another
judge stated a strong disinclination to award fees in excess of 10% if the defendent admitted owing
the amount in question.
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There is no information readily available which would indicate
whether plaintiffs counsel are regularly inclined to seek compensation
from their clients in addition to the amount recovered from the defendant through a judicial award.3 6 If this is a common practice, it would
seem to vitiate the objective of the model inexpensive small claims
court.

V.

THE JUDICIAL VIEW

In terms of speedy trial of small claims cases, critics of the use of
counsel in small claims courts assert that lawyers tend to lengthen trials
of small claims cases and obfuscate the issues. The questionnaire sent
to judges asked whether the judges trying small claims cases in
Oklahoma believed that the presence of counsel slowed the trial of
cases. Slightly fewer than half of the judges (43.75%) found that the
presence of lawyers slowed the trials, while slightly more than half
(56.25%) reached the opposite conclusion.
At first glance, this response would seem to substantiate the critics'
view that lawyers are detrimental to small claims litigation because
they slow it. Slowing a trial, however, is not necessarily detrimental if
it produces a more appropriate outcome. To investigate this aspect of
the issue, the judges were asked whether lawyers in small claims litigation "aided materially" in the trial of small claims cases or whether
they had a "detrimental impact" on such cases (two separate items on
the questionnaire). Forty judges (62.5%) responded that counsel aided
materially in the trial of small claims cases while only seven (13.2%)
responded negatively.37 Clearly in the minds of Oklahoma small
claims judges "slowing" a trial is not to be equated with having a detrimental effect upon it. Some judges indicate a desire for more information in deciding cases-information apparently easier to obtain from
counsel-assisted plaintiffs.
Given the fact that states are experimenting with various plans for
use of counsel in small claims courts, the judges were also asked to
express preferences concerning the most acceptable plan for Oklahoma
by ranking from most to least acceptable three options: a total ban on
36. The incidence of awarding of attorney's fees varies greatly among the counties in the
sample cases. In the cases actually involving use of plaintiffs counsel, fees were awarded in the

following percentage of cases: Tulsa County-73%; Oklahoma County-59%; Payne County31%.
37. The percentages here are based on the number of valid responses and omit the no-re-

sponse questionnaires.
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counsel, counsel only by leave of the court, and no restrictions on counsel. Each item was to be ranked individually, most to least, on a preference scale. Unfortunately, the rate of valid responses to this set of
questions was substantially below that for the rest of the questionnaire,
but the results are still valuable for assessing judicial opinion on the
matter.38 They are presented in Table III.
TABLE III
JUDICIAL PREFERENCE FOR COUNSEL SYSTEM

Least

Most
Favorable

Neutral

Favorable

Counsel Permitted

in All Cases

45

3

8

2

33

5

14

3

26

Counsel Permitted
by Leave of Court
Counsel Barred
from All Cases

From the responses it seems clear that judges are predominantly
disposed to retain the current system of permitting counsel in all cases.
The alternative of permitting counsel only by leave of the court received the least support as "first" choice, and the total ban of counsel
received the strongest opposition by "least favorable" ratings.
Finally, it is important to consider the number of cases in which
attorneys appear. The data from the sample cases reported in the earlier article39 indicated a wide disparity among the three counties, so the
judges were asked to estimate the percentage of cases filed in which
counsel were employed. The responses are reported in Table IV.
TABLE IV
COUNSEL IN SMALL CLAIMS
Under

10-25%

26-50%

Over 50%

Total

10
(15.4%)

4
(6.1%)

2
(3.1%)

65
(100%)

10%
Judges
Responding

49
(75.4%)

The estimates by judges would indicate that the effect of counsel in
small claims courts may be somewhat limited in many counties because
38. When a judge responded by marking an "X" instead of "M" (for most favorable) or "L"
(for least favorable), the "X" was treated as being a most favorable response.
39. Spurrier, supra note 6.
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in only a small proportion of cases are plaintiffs represented. The data
in Table IV, however, are not equally weighted in terms of caseload by
county. The sample cases from Tulsa County showed that counsel
were used at a rate of almost fifty percent; and because that county has
the highest small claims caseload, it would increase the statewide percentage far more than would other counties. Still, in many counties of
Oklahoma the effect of counsel is limited to a relatively small percentage of cases filed.
The findings from the data, then, indicate that Oklahoma's statute
basically complies with the norms of a model small claims court in that
it affords a simplified procedure, minimal expense, speedy resolution of
cases, and the opportunity for judicial balancing between represented
and pro se plaintiffs. Represented plaintiffs do fare better in small
claims litigation than theirprose counterparts, particularly in the areas
of total victory percentage, default judgment percentage, and percentage of cases involving an award of damages equal to the amount
claimed. About half of the judges report that lawyers slow the trial of
small claims cases, but this does not translate into a belief that they are
detrimental to the adjudication of small claims. Finally, judges prefer
retaining the present system to adopting one which would ban counsel
altogether or permit counsel only by leave of the court.
V.

RECOMMENDED REFORMS

The findings of this study point out two serious shortcomings in
the construction and operation of the Oklahoma Small Claims Procedure Act. First, so long as the small claims court aims to servepro se
litigants, the demonstrated advantages for represented plaintiffs conflict
with the goal of equality of represented and pro se litigants. Second,
the provisions for attorney's fees penalize litigants who appear in court
and lose rather than those who elect to avoid appearance and lose by
default judgment.
To remedy these shortcomings, the legislature should amend the
Act. Most preferable would be an amendment permitting counsel in
small claims cases only by special leave of the court. This would preserve the intendedpro se nature of the court while allowing for counsel
in the unusual case in which the judge deems assistance vital. This
could mean more work for the judge in one sense. If judges are subjected to numerous petitions for leave to represent in small claims
cases, they would simply have that many more issues to decide. Still,
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by letting it be known that these petitions would be denied in all but
highly unusual cases-and by adhering firmly to such a rule-the incidence of such attempts could be held to a manageable and consistent
level.
One exception to the rule barring counsel except by leave of the
court should be made for an attorney who is the plaintiff or defendant
in a small claims case. In this event, the attorney should be given the
same right to present his own case as any other individual.40 It would
be appropriate in such cases for the judge to allow the defendant to
have counsel. This type of amendment to the Act would also prevent a
potential avoidance of the statutory ban on access to small claims
courts by a collection agent or agency or an assignee. 4 1 The Desk Manual of the Oklahoma Bar Association suggests that this ban may be
42
skirted by the appearance of counsel rather than thepro se plaintiff
While the Desk Manual notes that there are no cases on this point, the
legislation suggested would render the point moot.
The judicial response to such proposed reforms was not favorable.
Arguably, however, the judges' responses were based on their own experiences in trying cases involving represented parties against pro se
parties. The data show that judges believe themselves capable of correcting potential imbalances in the trial of a small claims case. The
problem, however, is that counsel have their greatest effect on small
claims cases which do not go to trial. It is in these situations that the
presence of counsel for the plaintiff apparently significantly deters a
defendant from appearing in court. The judges polled were unlikely to
have been aware of this element of the equation because it heretofore
43
has not been mentioned in the literature on Oklahoma courts.
Amending legislation should also revise the forms used. A defendant in a small claims case should be notified that neither party to the
case will be allowed to have an attorney without special permission by
the court. Having this sort of notification on the affidavit filed should
prevent out-of-court actions by attorneys from deterring the defendant
40. In the case of fee collection, it might well be more economical for an attorney to send a
secretary or bookkeeper in the same fashion that a business might send its accounts clerk.
41. These parties are denied access to small claims court by the Act. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12,
§ 1751 (Supp. 1978).
42. OKLAHomA BAR AsSOCmnAON, DESK MANUAL SC-I (1977).

43. Interestingly enough, judges in states which prohibit appearance of counsel are overwhelmingly in favor of the system. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 1, at 2431. Judges from states which permitted counsel, similar to those surveyed in Oklahoma, were
divided on the point.
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from appearing. For example, if a lawyer writes the defendant on behalf of the plaintiff before instigation of the small claims action, the
defendant may well believe that the attorney will pursue the case in the
courtroom. Thus the deterrent effect already discussed would still be
likely.
Another matter for legislative reform is the amount of attorney's
fees allowed in small claims litigation. If attorney's fees are not limited
in contested cases, they can exceed the amount in controversy and
render the small claims process a very expensive one, thereby frustrating the goal of the model court. There are similar results where an
attorney charges his client fees beyond those awarded by the court in a
default judgment or after contest. A statutory limit of ten percent of
the judgment as the maximum attorney's fee in all types of small claims
cases would be far better. This would include the allowable charge to a
client in a small claims case as well as the amount which could be
awarded by the court. The advantages of such a limitation are obvious
in terms of keeping small claims cases inexpensive for the litigants. In
addition, the defendant who appears will no longer be penalized in
comparison with his defaulting counterpart.
What of the effect of these proposals on the legal profession and
litigants who strongly desire counsel? First, nothing prevents the litigant from consulting his attorney before proceedingpro se in the small
claims court. This would no doubt be a wise course of action for a
novice to learn what must be proved and what types of evidence will be
necessary. Second, the litigant always retains the option to proceed in
district court with an attorney's aid rather than to make use of small
claims court.
From the standpoint of the legal profession, the proposals would
not necessarily be detrimental. The judges interviewed indicated that
many attorneys appear in small claims court as a favor to clients with
other, more important business. Rather than offend an important client, a lawyer will often go to court on a small claims matter. The
judges indicated that many attorneys found this a somewhat onerous,
but necessary part of their practice. Judges in the three counties whose
courts were observed customarily allow counsel to try their cases first so
that they may leave the court without waiting through thepro se cases,
apparently in recognition that the attorneys' time is more valuable elsewhere. If the legislature were to bar counsel from all but exceptional
small claims cases, these attorneys would no longer be forced into the

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol15/iss1/5

14

Spurrier: Use of Counsel in Oklahoma Small Claims Courts: Judicial Percepti
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 15:70

position of having to choose between offending a client or spending
unrewarded time in small claims court.
The responses to the survey of judges reveal that such statutory
changes would not have a dramatic effect on the bar. As only a small
percentage of cases involve represented parties, a significant effect on
the practice of many attorneys is highly unlikely. Given the small
amounts involved, and the relatively few cases, the gain for the system
of small claims adjudication in terms of fairness of treatment of litigants from reform would surely outweigh the minimal financial cost to
a relatively few lawyers. From the preceding paragraph it is even possible to argue that the financial effect could be a positive one if the
attorneys affected were to spend their time on more lucrative cases instead.
These recommendations are generally consistent with the conclusions of the American Bar Association Report on the National Conference on Minor Disputes Resolution, which states, "It is usually not
practical to utilize attorneys in their traditional adversary role"' in
small claims courts. The recommendation of the National Center for
State Courts for improved assistance topro se litigants is to "make attorneys unnecessary at trial in the great majority of small claims
cases." 45 It should be noted that the ABA Report suggests other roles
which attorneys could assume in the small claims resolution process,
such as volunteer dispute resolvers. Also, both reports recognize that
there may be occasional cases which will require the assistance of counsel for the parties.
Should the legislature adopt either, or both, of these two proposed
reforms, limitation on appearance of counsel and limitation on fees, it
will thereby move closer to the goal of a small claims court which is
truly responsive to the needs of thepro se litigant and of an inexpensive
forum for a speedy resolution of the case without the likelihood of the
adverse effects of a represented opponent. Until now, empirical data
were not available to indicate the effect of counsel on the Oklahoma
small claims courts; but given the findings of this study, there is reason
for the legislature to give careful attention to amending the Oklahoma
Small Claims Procedure Act to further the goals of a model small
claims act.
44. A.B.A. Report, supra note 1, at 8.
45. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 1, at 194.
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